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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Shawn William Wass appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine).  Specifically, he challenges the denial of his motion to 
suppress. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 In its oral ruling denying Wass’s motion to suppress evidence, the district 
court summarized the facts underlying Wass’s conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) (with bracketed references to the 
suppression hearing transcript (“SH Tr.”)), as follows: 
 Thank you. I’m finding the following facts in this case: On 
August 9 of this year, Officer Drake saw a purple car parked at 
Midland sportsman’s access.  [SH Tr., p.5, L.21 – p.7, L.6.] This 
was after midnight and it was dark and testified [sic] that that area 
is closed during the nighttime.  [SH Tr., p.5, L.21 – p.7, L.10.]  He 
did a welfare check and saw the defendant standing near the car.  
[SH Tr., p.7, Ls.2–18.]  A female was in the passenger seat.  [SH 
Tr., p.7, Ls.6-7.]   
 
 They [sic] asked if there had been any drinking.  [SH Tr., p.9, 
Ls.5-6.]  The defendant admitted he had been drinking.[1]  He gave 
him field sobriety tests which he passed.  [SH Tr., p.11, Ls.5-11.]   
 
 Initially, the defendant said he didn’t have any ID on him but 
when the officer checked his name through dispatch, it confirmed 
there were some active warrants.  [SH Tr., p.8, L.13 – p.10, L.10.]  
He produced his driver’s license and his wallet.  [SH Tr., p.10, 
                                            
1  Although Deputy Drake testified that the female (“Grace”) responded to his 
question about whether she had been drinking, he did not say whether Wass 
answered the same question directed at him.  (See SH Tr., p.9, Ls.5-8.)  
According to the deputy, Grace said she and Wass had been drinking earlier in 




L.25.]  He was placed under arrest on these active warrants.  [SH 
Tr., p.11, Ls.13-14.] 
 
 After he was placed under arrest, the officer asked him is 
there anything illegal in the car and he responded that there was 
[sic] some syringes in a pouch[2] in the car and both parties admit 
that this was pre Miranda.[3]  [SH Tr., p.11, Ls.18-24; p.23, Ls.17-
22.] 
 
 Shortly – about two minutes afterwards, he gave the Miranda 
warnings to the defendant and the defendant made the same 
statements.[4]  [SH Tr., p.12, L.20 – p.14, L.9.]   
 
(SH Tr., p.25, L.17 – p.26, L.13.)  According to Deputy Drake, after Wass made 
his post-Miranda statements, the deputy searched the vehicle and found the 
syringes Wass described, as well as “a small foil bindle with some green leafy 
substance” in the backpack behind the driver’s seat.  (SH Tr., p.15, Ls.4-11.)  
The state charged Wass with possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) (R., pp.29-30), and cited him in a separate case with 
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) and possession 
of drug paraphernalia (R., pp.12-13).  Prior to trial, Wass filed a motion to 
suppress all admissions and confessions made to law enforcement due to the 
“unwarned and coercive nature of the interrogation,” and all evidence seized from 
                                            
2  Deputy Drake testified that prior to giving Miranda warnings, when asked 
whether “there was anything illegal in the vehicle,” Wass replied, “Yes, there are 
syringes.”  (SH Tr., p.11, Ls.18-24.)  The only references to “pouch” are in the 
deputy’s testimony about what Wass said after he was Mirandized (SH Tr., p.14, 
Ls.3-6), and where the deputy later located the syringes (SH Tr., p.18, Ls.12-15).  
 
3  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
4  In his post-Miranda statement, Wass did not merely repeat that there were 
syringes in the vehicle.  Deputy Drake testified that Wass “reiterated that there 
were syringes in the back.  He described where they were, in a Game Boy pouch 
in a backpack behind the driver’s seat.  . . .   I asked him if the syringes were 




the vehicle.  (R., pp.42-51.)  Wass’s motion contended that his statements to law 
enforcement were not obtained pursuant to Miranda, and the search of the 
vehicle was not a valid search incident to arrest under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332 (2009).  (Id.)   The district court denied Wass’s suppression motion, ruling 
that the Miranda violation regarding his first statement was cured when the 
deputy subsequently gave Wass his Miranda warnings; because the second 
statement was admissible, it justified a search of the vehicle under the 
automobile exception.  (SH Tr., p.26, L.13 – p.27, L.7.) 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wass entered a conditional guilty plea to 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), reserving the right to 
appeal the denial of his suppression motion, and the remaining charges were 
dismissed.  (R., pp.12-13, 75-78.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence 
of seven years with three years fixed, all suspended, and placed Wass on 








 Wass states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wass’ motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 








Wass Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
 
A. Introduction 
Wass’s motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from the vehicle 
was based on his assertion that, following his arrest on outstanding warrants, the 
search of the vehicle was not a valid search incident to arrest under Gant, 556 
U.S. 332.  (R., pp.42-51.)  Wass’s suppression motion also contended that his 
statements to law enforcement should be suppressed because they were 
obtained through “unwarned” questioning.5  (Id.)   
In response to Wass’s suppression motion, the state argued that the 
physical evidence was admissible under the automobile exception to the search 
warrant requirement because, even if the Miranda rule was violated in regard to 
both of Wass’s statements, suppression of physical evidence is not required 
unless the statement leading to the evidence was involuntary.  In regard to 
Wass’s statements, the state argued that under Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 
(1985), although Wass’s pre-Miranda statement was inadmissible, his post-
Miranda statement was admissible because it was not coerced and, further, in 
contrast to the circumstances in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), Deputy 
Drake did not engage “in any type of ‘question first’ tactics seeking to subvert the 
effectiveness of the Miranda warnings.”  (R., pp.59-67.)   
                                            
5  The state does not dispute, nor did it below, that Wass’s pre-Miranda 
statement to Deputy Drake is inadmissible.   (See R., p.61 (“The State does not 




In its oral ruling at the end of the suppression hearing, the district court did 
not address the state’s first argument – that, regardless of any Miranda violation, 
suppression of physical evidence is not warranted unless the statement leading 
to the seizure of evidence was coerced or involuntary.  (See R., p.65.)  Instead, 
the court held that the non-compliance with Miranda regarding Wass’s first 
statement was cured when the deputy subsequently gave him Miranda warnings 
because there was no coercion, and the initial failure to give the warnings was 
not done as a calculated way to undermine Wass’s free will.  (SH Tr., p.26, L.13 
– p.27, L.7.)  The court concluded that, because the Miranda violation was cured 
by the subsequent giving of Miranda warnings, the post-Miranda statement gave 
the officer “reasonable articulable suspicion[6] to search the vehicle under the 
automobile search warrantless exception . . . .”  (SH Tr., p.27, Ls.2-7.)    
 On appeal, Wass contends his post-Miranda statement should be 
suppressed because “[t]he Miranda warnings . . . inserted in the midst of what 
was effectively a single interrogation, did not effectively advise Mr. Wass of his 
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-11.)  Wass 
argues that, because his post-Miranda statement is inadmissible under Miranda, 
it cannot be relied upon to establish probable cause to search the vehicle under 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-11, 
and p.10 (“Absent Mr. Wass’ first pre-Miranda statement, and his second, post-
                                            
6  The district court misspoke.  The “automobile exception” to the warrant 
requirement allows a vehicle to be searched without a warrant when there is 
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a 
crime.  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 




ineffective Miranda statement, Deputy Drake lacked reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause for a drug investigation.”).)    
 Contrary to Wass’s arguments, the district court correctly denied his 
motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from the vehicle, albeit on 
grounds different than those expressed by the court.  See State v. Morris, 119 
Idaho 448, 450, 807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate review, the 
lower court’s ruling must be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on any theory); 
State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 863, 934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1997) (where 
district court’s ruling is correct it may be upheld on alternative basis).  The court 
also correctly denied Wass’s motion to suppress his post-Miranda statement.      
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).  Decisions regarding 
the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and factual 
inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court. State v. 






C. Even Assuming All Of Wass’s Statements Are Inadmissible Under 
Miranda, Suppression Of The Physical Evidence Is Not Warranted 
Because He Has Failed To Show The Statements Were Involuntary 
 
Assuming, arguendo, that Wass’s statements were obtained in violation of 
Miranda, the physical evidence seized from the vehicle would not be subject to 
suppression.7  As the United States Supreme Court explained in United States v. 
Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004): 
[T]he Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against 
violations of the Self–Incrimination Clause.  The Self–Incrimination 
Clause, however, is not implicated by the admission into evidence 
of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement.  Accordingly, there is 
no justification for extending the Miranda rule to this context.  And 
just as the Self–Incrimination Clause primarily focuses on the 
criminal trial, so too does the Miranda rule.  The Miranda rule is not 
a code of police conduct, and police do not violate the Constitution 
(or even the Miranda rule, for that matter) by mere failures to warn.  
For this reason, the exclusionary rule articulated in such cases as 
Wong Sun does not apply. 
 
Id. at 636-37 (emphasis added).  Thus, physical evidence cannot be suppressed 
merely due to a failure to give Miranda warnings.8  Rather, for the exclusionary 
                                            
7  Wass’s contention that the deputy “lacked reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause for a drug investigation” due to the ineffectiveness of Miranda warnings 
given before his second statement (and no warnings before his first statement) 
makes a jump in logic that is unsupported by any authority.  (See Appellant’s 
Brief, pp.10-11.)  As United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636-637 (2004), 
holds, the physical fruit of un-Mirandized statements is admissible if such a 
statement was voluntary.   
   
8  The district court determined that Wass’s post-Miranda statement was not 
coerced.  However, under Patane, evidence seized from the vehicle would be 
admissible as physical fruit of Wass’s pre-Miranda statement even though that 
statement did not comply with Miranda -- assuming it was also voluntary.  See 
Patane, 542 U.S. at 636-637.  Because it makes no difference which of Wass’s 
statements led to the seizure of evidence from the vehicle, and because the 
district court concluded that his post-Miranda statement was voluntary, the state 




rule to possibly apply, police must obtain the evidence through coercion.  State v. 
Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 781, 152 P.3d 645, 652 (Ct. App. 2006).  Wass has not 
alleged that his statements were obtained through police coercion for good 
reason – there was none.  (See generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-11.) 
 Deputy Drake testified that he mistakenly omitted giving Wass his Miranda 
warnings prior to Wass’s first statement, but that he subsequently gave the 
warnings to Wass before his second statement, as follows: 
A  I placed him under arrest for the warrants and then begin 
[sic] to walk him back to my vehicle. 
 
Q When you say you placed him under arrest, did you put him 
in handcuffs? 
 
A Yes, I did. 
 
Q Okay.  Now, as you’re walking to your vehicle, what 
happens? 
 
A I asked him if there was anything illegal in the vehicle and he 
replied, “Yes, there are syringes.” 
 
Q Okay.  And just to be clear, this is prior to the issuing of any 
Miranda warnings. 
 
A That is correct. 
 
Q Now, right after the defendant responds with that answer, 
what are you thinking to yourself? 
 
A I was thinking that I made a mistake. 
 
 [Defense Objection Overruled]   
 
 I was thinking that I’d made a mistake and that I should stop 
asking questions. 
 
Q Okay.  Did you stop? 
 




Q Okay.  So what do you do next? 
 
A I placed him in the back of my vehicle and secured him in 
there and at this time, Deputy Bailey Wilson had arrived to 
assist in field sobriety tests for Grace.  And I wanted to 
double-check and make sure that she did not need any help.  
I also looked through the windows of the vehicle to see if 
there was anything illegal in plain view and there was not. 
 
Q At some point, do you go back to speak with the defendant 
again? 
 
A I did. 
 
Q Now, how much time has elapsed from when you put him 
into your car till you come back up to speak with him again? 
 
A Approximately two minutes. 
 
Q Okay.  So when you made contact with him again, what do 
you say initially? 
 
A I open the door and I said, “Well, I need to read you your 
Miranda warning,” and I went ahead and did so.  Explained 
the Miranda rights and then after that, I asked him, with 
those rights in mind, does he still want to talk about anything 
illegal in the vehicle. 
 
Q So did you ascertain whether he understood those 
warnings? 
 
A Yes.  After I asked him if he still wanted to talk, he said yes, 
he understood and that he would still want to talk to me. 
 
 [Objection By Defense Counsel Sustained] 
 
Q As you were asking questions, was the defendant giving 
answers that made sense under the context of those 
questions? 
 
A Yes, he did. 
 






A I asked him if there was anything illegal in the vehicle and 
he, again, reiterated that there were syringes in the back.  
He described where they were, in a Game Boy pouch in a 
backpack behind the driver’s seat.  I asked him if he was 
diabetic.  He said no.  I asked him if the syringes were 
loaded and he said no.  I believe that was it. 
 
 . . . . 
 
Q So at this point, had you made any threats to the defendant? 
 
A No, I have [sic] not. 
 
Q Had you made any promises? 
 
A No, I did not. 
 
Q Had you unholstered your gun or any other weapon? 
 
A No, I did not. 
 
Q Had you confronted him with his prior statement? 
 
A Excuse me? 
 




Q And so after he makes this second statement, what do you 
do? 
 
A I then went and searched the vehicle . . . . 
 
(SH Tr.,  p.11, L.13 - p.15, L.8.)  
 Deputy Drake’s testimony gives no hint that Wass’s statements were 
obtained through coercion or made involuntarily.  The district court obviously 
found the deputy’s testimony credible, ruling that he did not coerce Wass’s post-
Miranda statements or “undermine” Wass’s “ability to exercise free will,” stating: 
I find that the officer did not tactically induce a confession prior to 




tactics to obtain the confession prior to Miranda warnings.  And 
the second Miranda warnings does [sic] cure the failure to 
administer it the first time. 
 
 It’s not a coercion where the actual circumstances are 
calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise free will.  
So I find that the second Miranda warnings does [sic] cure it.   
 
(SH Tr., p.26, L.19 – p.27, L.3.) 
 The district court’s ruling that Wass’s post-Miranda statement was not 
coerced by Deputy Drake or made involuntarily (i.e., “ability to exercise free will”) 
relates to the state’s argument that the statement was admissible under Elstad 
and Seibert.  That ruling necessarily embraces a finding that Wass’s post-
Miranda statement was not coerced or involuntary for purposes of the 
“involuntary statement” exception to the Patane rule that Miranda violations do 
not otherwise lead to suppression of physical evidence.  Patane, 542 U.S. at 
636-637.   
 Therefore, under Patane, because Wass’s post-Miranda statement that 
there were (illegal) syringes in the vehicle was voluntary, the evidence was 
properly seized from the vehicle (under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement) as physical fruit of such statement – regardless of whether the 
statement was obtained in compliance with the Miranda rule.  See Patane, 542 
U.S. at 636-637; Carroll, 267 U.S. 132.  The district court’s denial of Wass’s 
motion to suppress, as related to the physical evidence, must therefore be 
affirmed on this correct alternative basis.  See Morris, 119 Idaho at 450, 807 P.2d 





D.  Wass Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His 
Motion To Suppress His Post-Miranda Statement  
  
 On appeal, Wass has not argued that his post-Miranda statement was 
involuntary.  Rather, he argues that, under Seibert, the admissibility of his second 
statement turns on whether ‘“a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes could 
have seen the [second round of] questioning as a new and distinct experience, 
[and whether] the Miranda warnings could have made sense as presenting a 
genuine choice whether to follow up on the earlier admission.’”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.9 (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616) (brackets in original).)   
 Wass’s argument fails because (1) under Seibert, the “effectiveness” 
standard does not apply unless the “two-step” strategy (i.e., statement first, 
Miranda warnings second) was used to deliberately undermine Miranda – which 
Wass does not allege and which the district court expressly found was not the 
case, and (2) even if the “effectiveness” standard is applicable, a reasonable 
person in Wass’s position would “have understood [the warnings] to convey a 
message that [he] retained a choice about continuing to talk.”  Seibert, 542 U.S. 
at 617.  
  
1. Seibert’s “Effectiveness” Standard Does Not Apply Because Deputy 
Drake Did Not Deliberately Use The Two-Step Strategy To 
Undermine The Miranda Warnings  
 
 The United States Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of post-
Miranda statements made in circumstances similar to those of this case in 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298.  In Elstad, a burglary suspect made an initial incriminating 




the police station made a full confession, after receiving a proper Miranda 
warning and waiving his rights.  Id. at 300-02.  He later argued that the second 
statement should be suppressed because it was related to the unwarned first 
statement, and likely induced or caused by it.  Id. at 302.  The Supreme Court 
rejected that argument.  In holding the second statement admissible and 
voluntary, the Court reasoned:  
[A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the 
initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an 
unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of 
compulsion.  A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a 
suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement 
ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded 
admission of the earlier statement.   
 
Id. at 301 (emphasis added).  The Court further observed: 
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple 
failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual 
coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the 
suspect’s ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory 
process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is 
ineffective for some indeterminate period. 
 
Id. at 309 (emphasis added).   
In Seibert, a four-member plurality determined that, when any “mid-
stream” warning (i.e., statement – Miranda warnings – statement) is used by law 
enforcement, the admissibility of a post-Miranda statement depends on “whether 
it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could 
function ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires,” and found the post-Miranda statement 
in that case inadmissible.9  Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-612; United States v. 
                                            
9  The plurality opinion in Seibert noted the following factors are relevant to 




Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006).  In Williams, the Ninth Circuit 
explained Justice Kennedy’s crucial concurring opinion in Seibert: 
Although Justice Kennedy agreed that Seibert could be 
distinguished from Elstad, he viewed the plurality’s test for 
admissibility as “cut[ting] too broadly” because the objective inquiry 
into a midstream Miranda warning’s effectiveness applied “to every 
two-stage interrogation.”  Id. at 621-22, 124 S.Ct. 2601.  At the 
same time, he recognized that in Seibert’s case, the police withheld 
the Miranda warning “to obscure both the practical and legal 
significance of the admonition when finally given.”  Id. at 620, 124 
S.Ct. 2601.  To avoid undermining Miranda’s “clarity,” Justice 
Kennedy would also evaluate the effectiveness of a midstream 
warning using an objective inquiry, but only in cases in which the 
police deliberately employed the two-step strategy to undermine 
Miranda:  
 
If the deliberate two-step strategy has been used, 
postwarning statements that are related to the 
substance of prewarning statements must be 
excluded unless curative measures are taken before 
the postwarning statement is made.  Curative 
measures should be designed to ensure that a 
reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would 
understand the import and effect of the Miranda 
warning and of the Miranda waiver.  For example, a 
substantial break in time and circumstances between 
the prewarning statement and the Miranda warning 
may suffice in most circumstances.... Alternatively, an 
additional warning that explains the likely 
inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement 
may be sufficient. 
 
Id. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (emphasis added).  However, absent a 
showing that the law enforcement officers deliberately used the 
question-first tactic to lessen the warning’s effectiveness, Justice 
Kennedy would apply Elstad’s voluntariness standards to determine 
whether the postwarning confession is admissible.  Id. at 622, 124 
S.Ct. 2601.  Because the officers in Seibert deliberately employed 
                                                                                                                                  
of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping 
content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, 
the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s 
questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.”  Seibert, 542 




the question-first technique and then took no curative measures to 
ensure that the midstream warning effectively apprised Seibert of 
her rights, Justice Kennedy joined the plurality in concluding that 
Seibert’s postwarning statement was inadmissible. Id. 
 
435 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 620-622; emphases in Williams). 
The Williams decision applied the Marks rule10 in delineating what the 
actual holding in Seibert was, which was necessary given the splintered sets of 
opinions.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:  
Ordinarily, “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 . . . 
(1977) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  We need not 
find a legal opinion which a majority joined, but merely “a legal 
standard which, when applied, will necessarily produce results with 
which a majority of the Court from that case would agree.”  
[Citations omitted.]  To determine whether Seibert contains a 
precedential holding, we must identify and apply a test which 
satisfies the requirements of both Justice Souter’s plurality opinion 
and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. 
  
Applying the Marks rule to Seibert, we hold that a trial court must 
suppress postwarning confessions obtained during a deliberate 
two-step interrogation where the midstream Miranda warning – in 
light of the objective facts and circumstances – did not effectively 
apprise the suspect of his rights.  Although the plurality would 
consider all two-stage interrogations eligible for a Seibert inquiry, 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion narrowed the Seibert exception to those 
cases involving deliberate use of the two-step procedure to weaken 
Miranda’s protections.  [Citations omitted.]  In other words, both the 
plurality and Justice Kennedy agree that where law enforcement 
officers deliberately employ a two-step interrogation to obtain a 
confession and where separations of time and circumstance and 
additional curative warnings are absent or fail to apprise a 
reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes of his rights, the trial 
court should suppress the confession.  This narrower test – that 
excludes confessions made after a deliberate, objectively 
ineffective mid-stream warning – represents Seibert’s holding.  In 
                                            




situations where the two-step strategy was not deliberately 
employed, Elstad continues to govern the admissibility of 
postwarning statements.   
 
Williams, 435 F.3d at 1157-1158 (emphasis in original).   
 Although there is not unanimity among the federal circuits as to the 
holding of Seibert (see Appellant’s Brief, p.10 n.2), the vast majority of courts 
considering the issue are in agreement that Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
constitutes the holding of that case.11  As explained in Carter v. State, 309 
S.W.3d 31, 38 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193): 
But it is well settled that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case 
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments 
on the narrowest grounds.”  We therefore join numerous state and 
federal jurisdictions in adopting Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Seibert because it is narrower in scope than the plurality opinion 
and applies only to two-step interrogations involving deliberate 
police misconduct.  Consequently, the question is whether the 
evidence shows that Trooper Henderson deliberately employed a 
two-step “question first, warn later” interrogation technique to 
                                            
11  See United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221, 231–32 (3d Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 308–09 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 
1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1142 (8th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Gonzalez–Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1136 n. 6 (11th Cir. 
2006); Carroll v. State, 2015 WL 4876584, at *19 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 2015); 
People v. Rios, 179 Cal. App. 4th 491, 505, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 713, 723 (Cal. App. 
2d Dist. 2009); State v. Bruce, 169 So.3d 671, 679 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2015); People 
v. Lopez, 892 N.E.2d 1047, 1069 (Ill. 2008); State v. Nightingale, 58 A.3d 1057, 
1067-1068 (Me. 2012) (“We now follow the majority of the federal circuits in 
applying Justice Kennedy’s Seibert analysis.”); State v. Collings, 449 S.W.3d 
803, 808 (Mo. 2014); Kuhne v. Commonwealth, 733 S.E.2d 667, 672-674 (Va. 
App. 2012); State v. Hickman, 238 P.3d 1240, 1244 (Wash. App. 2010); but see 
United States v. Carrizales–Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that 
both the Seibert plurality and the four dissenting justices rejected Justice 
Kennedy’s focus on the officer’s intent); State v. Dailey, 273 S.W.3d 94, 107-110 
(Tenn. 2009) (applying both the Seibert plurality “effectiveness” test and Justice 




circumvent appellant’s Miranda protections. 
 
 This Court should follow the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, both 
federal and state, that have adopted Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Seibert as 
the operative holding in that case.  Justice Kennedy limited the plurality’s 
requirement, that an “effectiveness” test be employed in every case where 
Miranda warnings are given “mid-stream,” to situations where police deliberately 
use the question-first tactic to diminish the effect of such warnings.  There is no 
scenario where Justice Kennedy would use the effectiveness test and the 
plurality would not, but the reverse would not be true.  Therefore, under Marks, 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence constitutes “that position taken by those 
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”  Marks, 
430 U.S. at 193.    
 Here, as in Elstad, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that 
Deputy Drake’s brief pre-Miranda question to Wass was anything other than “a 
simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion 
or other circumstances calculated to undermine [Wass’s] ability to exercise his 
free will.”  See Elstad, 470 U.S. at.309; State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 910, 
155 P.3d 704, 711 (Ct. App. 2006) (same).  The record shows that while Deputy 
Drake and Wass walked to the patrol vehicle after Wass’s arrest, the deputy 
asked Wass whether “there was anything illegal in the vehicle.”  (SH Tr., p.11, 
Ls.18-21.)  When Wass responded, “Yes, there are syringes,” the deputy “was 
thinking that [he had] made a mistake and that [he] should stop asking 




p.12, L.11.)  Deputy Drake placed Wass in the back seat of the patrol car, and 
after looking through the windows of Wass’s vehicle, the deputy went back to the 
patrol car two minutes later and read Wass his Miranda warnings.12  (SH Tr., 
p.11, L.20 – p.13, L.1.)  After Wass waived his Miranda rights, the deputy again 
asked him if there was anything illegal in the vehicle, and Wass said there were 
syringes in the Game Boy pouch in the backpack behind the driver’s seat.  (SH 
Tr., p.13, L.6 – p.14, L.6.)   
The district court implicitly found the deputy’s testimony that he made a 
mistake was credible, and concluded that he “did not tactically induce a 
confession prior to Miranda warnings – or coerce a confession or use improper 
tactics to obtain the confession prior to Miranda warnings.”  (SH Tr., p.26, Ls.19-
22); see Munoz, 149 Idaho at 128, 233 P.3d at 59.  Because the Miranda 
warnings in this case were not “inserted in the midst of coordinated and 
continuing interrogation,” and because Deputy Drake did not deliberately use the 
question-first tactic to lessen the warning’s effectiveness, Elstad controls and 
Seibert does not apply.   
Under the circumstances of this case, because Wass’s post-Miranda 
statement was voluntary, and because the mid-stream giving of Miranda 
warnings was not part of a deliberate strategy by Deputy Drake to make the 
                                            
12  The fact that Deputy Drake placed Wass in the patrol car and waited two 
minutes (while conducting a “plain view” check of Wass’s vehicle) before giving 
Wass his Miranda warnings does not convert an innocent error into a calculated 
plot to undermine the effectiveness of Miranda warnings.  As stated in Williams, 
‘“absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial 
statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does 
not warrant a presumption of compulsion’ with respect to the postwarning 




warnings less effective, there is no basis for suppressing the statement Wass 
made to the deputy after he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.  Wass has 
failed to show any error in the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress his 
post-Miranda statement. 
 
2. Even If The “Effectiveness” Standard Is Applicable, A Reasonable 
Person In Wass’s Position Would Have Understood The Miranda 
Warnings As Informing Him That He Had A Choice About 
Continuing To Talk 
 
 Wass argues that a person in his position “would not have seen Deputy 
Drake’s second round of questioning as a separate and distinct experience from 
the first, and would not have believed he had a genuine choice regarding 
whether to remain silent.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  Wass contends that the 
application of Seibert plurality’s “effectiveness” factors support his position that 
the interrogation was continuous because the two sets of questions were made 
“in the same location, within a matter of minutes, to the same police officer.”13  
(Id.)    
 Assuming, arguendo, that the Seibert “effectiveness” test applies, either 
because Deputy Drake allegedly employed a deliberate strategy to undermine 
the effectiveness of Miranda warnings, or, in following the plurality opinion that 
                                            
13 As summarized in Williams, the factors to be considered in determining 
whether mid-stream Miranda warnings were effective are:  “(1) the completeness 
and detail of the prewarning interrogation, (2) the overlapping content of the two 
rounds of interrogation, (3) the timing and circumstances of both interrogations, 
(4) the continuity of police personnel, (5) the extent to which the interrogator’s 
questions treated the second round of interrogation as continuous with the first 
and (6) whether any curative measures were taken.”  Williams, 435 F.3d at 1160 




would apply such a test in every case, the Miranda warnings given to Wass were 
effective.   
 Wass stresses the time, location, and the fact that the same officer 
interrogated him in regard to both sets of statements.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-
11); see Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615.  However, during the two minutes that elapsed 
from the time Deputy Drake placed Wass in the patrol car until he gave Wass his 
Miranda warnings, the deputy was not present with Wass.  Instead, he contacted 
another deputy who had arrived at the scene, then he looked through the 
windows of Wass’s vehicle.  (SH Tr., p.12, Ls. 2-19.)  Also, the two sets of 
questions were not in the same precise location – the first was while the deputy 
walked Wass to the patrol car, the second was while Wass sat in the patrol car.  
Regardless of how the “time” and “location” and “one officer” factors align, the 
overriding concern is whether a reasonable person in Wass’s position “would 
understand the import and effect of the Miranda warning.”  Seibert, 542 U.S. at 
622.  Other circumstances support the district court’s conclusion that the mid-
stream Miranda warnings effectively informed Wass that he could refuse to talk 
to Deputy Drake.   
 Deputy Drake engaged in very little interrogation leading to Wass’s un-
Mirandized statement.  While walking Wass to the patrol car after placing him 
under arrest, the deputy asked him a very general question – if there was 
anything illegal in his vehicle – which is hardly a complete and detailed pre-
warning interrogation.  (SH Tr., p.11, Ls.13-21); see Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615.   




repeated the same question to Wass two minutes later, after Wass was advised 
of and waived his Miranda rights, the question made no mention of “syringes,” 
and any overlapping content of the two rounds of interrogation was slight.  (SH 
Tr., p.11, Ls.18-21; p.12, L.23 – p.14, L.5); see Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615.   
 Instead of minimizing the impact of the Miranda warnings or reminding 
Wass specifically of his statement about “syringes,” the deputy stressed the 
importance of the Miranda warnings – “I asked him, with those rights in mind, 
does he still want to talk about anything illegal in the vehicle,” which reflects a 
curative measure by the deputy.  (SH Tr., p.13, Ls.6-8 (emphasis added)); see 
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615.  Most significantly, the deputy added, “[a]fter I asked 
him if he still wanted to talk, he said yes, he understood and that he would still 
want to talk to me.”  (SH Tr., p.13, Ls.11-13 (emphasis added).)  By Wass’s own 
admission to the deputy, he understood that, based on his Miranda warnings, he 
had the right to refuse to say anything or answer any questions.   
 The district court found that the Miranda warnings given by Deputy Drake 
cured any taint from the initial un-Mirandized statement (i.e., the Miranda 
warnings were “effective”), and that the deputy did not coerce Wass’s post-
Miranda statements or “undermine” Wass’s “ability to exercise free will,” stating: 
 After he was placed under arrest, the officer asked him is 
there anything illegal in the car and he responded that there was 
[sic] some syringes in a pouch[14] in the car and both parties admit 
that this was pre Miranda. 
  
                                            
14  As previously noted, Deputy Drake did not actually testify that Wass initially 
(i.e., pre-Miranda) said that the syringes were “in a pouch.”   (See n.2, supra; SH 




 Shortly – about two minutes afterwards, he gave the 
Miranda warnings to the defendant and the defendant made the 
same statements.  So the question is whether the drug evidence 
must be suppressed because the first – because of the first 
unwarned statements about the syringes or does the second 
statements after the – does [sic] the Miranda warnings given a few 
minutes later cure that problem. 
 
 And I find that it does cure the problem and I’m going to 
deny the suppression.  I find that the officer did not tactically 
induce a confession prior to Miranda warnings – or coerce a 
confession or use improper tactics to obtain the confession prior 
to Miranda warnings.  And the second Miranda warnings does 
[sic] cure the failure to administer it the first time. 
 
 It’s not a coercion where the actual circumstances are 
calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise free will.  
So I find that the second Miranda warnings does [sic] cure it.   
 
(SH Tr., p.26, L.7 – p.27, L.3.) 
 After considering the evidence, the district court correctly concluded, in 
effect, that “the deputy’s pre-Miranda interrogation regarding [illegal items inside 
the vehicle] was ‘a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by 
any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine [Wass’s] 
ability to exercise his free will.’”  Cardenas, 143 Idaho at 910, 155 P.3d at 711 
(quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309) (explanations added).   
 Even if reviewed for adherence with Seibert’s plurality opinion for a 
determination of whether the mid-stream Miranda warnings given to Wass 
effectively communicated that he had a real choice in whether to talk to Deputy 







 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Wass’s conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine).    
 DATED this 28th day of September, 2016. 
 
 
 _/s/ John C. McKinney__________ 
 JOHN C. McKINNEY 
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